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Abstract 
 The given article deals with the interests towards fit of passion of 
murder in the Science of Criminal Law of Georgia which already exists for a 
long time. It is stipulated by two causes: firstly, by permanent necessity 
towards investigation – judiciary practice which demands precise criteria of 
qualification of the act; secondly, by essential changes of criminal law 
doctrine in Georgia which caused working out of the new approach towards 
the problem of guilt. Consequently, Georgian scientists had to review a 
whole range of conceptions which did not answer demands of the present 
day. It is clear that due to complexity of the issue, it is hard to discuss 
approach of all conceptions in one article. We shall light briefly peculiarities 
of approach of Georgian scientists towards some conceptions. We should 
single out only so called argumentations of estimation for criminal and 
subject conceptions of psychological crime of guilt. 
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Interest towards the affective murder in criminal science of Georgia 
has existed for a long time. It is stipulated by two reasons: first, with the 
permanent demand towards investigational-judicial practice which requires 
exact criteria of qualification of the given act; second, by essential change of 
criminal doctrine in Georgia which required the development of a new 
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approach towards problem of guiltiness. In this regard, the Georgian 
scientists had to revise a great number of concepts that do not meet the 
requirements of modern times. Naturally, due to the complexity of the issue 
it is difficult to consider all the conceptual approaches in one article. We will 
try to briefly highlight peculiarity of Georgian scientists’ approach towards 
some concepts. Among them we will distinguish the argumentation of 
assessment of concepts of guilt, the so called crime subject and guilty person.  
1. The idea that guilt was a psychic attitude towards act and result 
and was dominant in the Soviet literature. For example, T. Shavgulidze 
considered that guilt was a person’s psychic attitude towards his/her 
unlawful activity. In his opinion, when lawmaker indicates the consciousness 
of social danger of an act as to the necessary element of intent, he/she means 
a person’s psychic attitude towards the social peculiarities of his/her act at 
the moment of committing the crime and not only the knowledge of an act 
peculiarity. For substantiation of intent during the affect, it is not difficult to 
prove whether the offender knows that murder is socially dangerous. But it is 
difficult to prove whether the offender realizes the social importance of 
his/her act at the moment of committing the crime. The psychological 
concept of guilt is especially dominant in Russia’s criminal law. As it is 
stated here, the affective murder “is less socially dangerous than a crime 
committed in the condition of calmed psyche”.  
Pure psychological notion of guilt has considerable defect due to 
which the qualification of act remains in a blind-alley. According to the 
doctrine, it turns out as though the social danger depends on psychic 
condition. According to O. Gamkrelidze, “During affective murder the 
degree of severity of injustice, its social danger cannot depend on psychic 
condition. Here, we deal with the case of diminished mental capacity which 
reduces the quality of social danger of guilt and not injustice, i.e. illegal act. 
European Scientific Journal    July 2013 /SPECIAL/ edition    ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
33 
A person being in affective state is in the state of reduced mental capacity 
despite the fact whether he/she is an especially dangerous recidivist or 
extremely decent person. Person shall be in affective state if he/she “calmly 
plans the entire process of commission of offence” and it will not affect the 
more or less danger. Here we deal with the guilt quality and not with the 
person’s danger”.  
2. When criticizing the so called subject concept the Georgian 
scientists also consider the issue of affective crime. In this case, the starting 
point is a provision that mental capacity-incapacity, age, psychic illness and 
any other event are connected not with the subject of crime, but with the 
issue of criminal responsibility. And a criminal responsibility preliminary 
implies the subject of crime; the subject, i.e. man is the leader of criminal 
responsibility. It should be taken into account that under-aged and mentally 
ill person can commit a criminal injustice. But how can the creature, who is 
not the subject of crime, commit the criminal injustice! In reality, the issue is 
decided totally otherwise. The point is that we have the subject of crime in 
the indicated cases, but we have no enough bases for criminal responsibility 
and, therefore, we free the offender and terminate the case proceedings 
towards him.  
For the illustration of this provision, O. Gamkrelidze considers the 
Article 111 of the Criminal Code, which deals with the special case of 
limited mental capacity. As they indicate, this time a person is in the state of 
limited mental capacity which diminishes the quality of his guilt. The fact 
that physiological affect does not exclude the criminal responsibility, but 
only attenuates the committed crime indicates that affect attenuates 
offender’s responsibility at the expense of diminishing his guilt. But the 
quality of injustice of murder this time remains the same; it does not 
diminish.  
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3. While developing the Article 111 of the Criminal Code, the 
Georgian scientists were consistently accomplishing the requirement of 
criminal principle of act. The provision that the affective state creates 
conditions that offender should be considered socially less dangerous 
compared with when offender calmly and without any affect plans the entire 
process of commission of offence, was denied from the start. 
As it is stated, the injustice of murder (illegal act) which is the basis 
of content of act described in the Article 111 does not differ from the 
injustice of contents described in the Articles 108 or 109. For instance, 
intentional murder of “two or more” persons is severely punished under the 
paragraph A of the Article 109, and murder of the same amount of persons in 
affective state causes mitigating responsibility under the Article 111. Thus, 
injustice of one and the same severity is severely punished by the Article 109 
and that of mitigatingly by the Article 111.  
This provision is based on the normative notion of the guilt, which, 
compared to the criminal law psychological concept of the then Soviet 
Republics, is dominant only in the criminal law of Georgia. According to the 
mentioned normative notion, when the court establishes injustice it starts to 
impute fault upon this injustice for its commission, if, of course, there is no 
any circumstance excluding the fault. During imputing, the following should 
be taken into account: 1. Degree of committed injustice; 2. Degree of guilt. 
According to it, imputing can be: 1) Full, 2) Enhanced, 3) Diminished. 
Correspondingly, imposing the responsibility and defining the type and size 
of punishment depend on this gradation. Imputing fault upon injustice should 
be leaded by ascertainment of consciousness of illegality, i.e., ascertainment 
of whether the accused knew that he/she committed the forbidden act and 
breached the prohibition. 
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The view that responsibility established by the Article 111 is 
reflected in the form of diminished mental capacity can be found in German 
literature as well. As the German lawyers state, the section 213 of the 
criminal law (“Less Serious Case of Manslaughter”) describes not the 
content of the act, but the rule of mitigation of punishment. In the opinion of 
Zh. Wessels and M. Hettinger, this paragraph describes the condition of 
applying the norm. G. Wolf also shares this opinion and states that section 
the 213 describes the provision of delivering judgment in the case which 
belongs to the cases generally described in the paragraph 212 (“Murder”). As 
O. Gamkrelidze states, the content of the act described in the Article 111 of 
the Criminal Code differs from the content described in the Article 106 of 
the Criminal Code of Georgia of 1960. The accurate list of circumstances 
causing affect under the Article 106 of the Criminal Code of Georgia of 1960 
was unjustly restricting the circle of the cases that really enable to mitigate 
the responsibility. Formulation of the Article 111 of the current code shall 
facilitate the correct legal qualification of the mentioned cases and just 
punishment of offender. As it seems, the author shares the idea that the 
condition of possibility of mitigation of responsibility is given in the Article 
111 of the Criminal Code.  
Here it should be noted that in the Criminal Code of German 
Federative Republic, the paragraph 213 is formulated obscurely and raises 
many questions. According to the mentioned paragraph, the performer is 
considered a person who committed murder without his/her fault during 
strong agitation, which was caused by provocative action towards the 
offender or his relatives. According to the mentioned novel it turns out that 
there exists illegal action, but the fault does not exist. Then, the issue arises, 
why is the person punished, if there is no fault? In reality, we deal with the 
reduction of fault degree and not with nonexistence of fault. Fault may not 
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exist in case when the person is sure that the powder handed on to him/her, 
which he/she has to give to an ill person, is a drug, but in reality it is a 
poison. As it has already been mentioned, during affective murder we have 
totally different picture – a diminished fault.  This approach has been 
successively realized in the Article 111 of the Criminal Code (intentional 
murder in a state of sudden, strong mental agitation caused by illegal 
violation, severe abuse or other immoral act by victim towards the offender 
or his close relative, as well as psychic trauma stipulated by illegal or 
immoral act of victim). Therefore, compared to the paragraph 213 of the 
German Code, the Article 111 of the Criminal Code is more refined and 
accurate.  
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